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Abstract 
While the school participation impacts of the Universal Primary Education policies in Sub-
Saharan Africa have been impressive, learning impacts’ assessment has received little attention. 
This study measures and explains the initial achievement impacts of the Free Primary Education 
(FPE) policy in Kenya using grade six pupils’ reading and math standardized test scores. We find 
large achievement declines, spillover effects to private schools and heterogeneous impacts by 
gender and socioeconomic status. The declines are associated with decreased teacher efforts and 
local community disengagement. Policy studies on pathways to increased local community 
involvement in public schools will lead to improved learning.         
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Individual productivity, earnings and national development are strongly associated with the stock 
of knowledge and skills the workforce possess, and not merely the number of school-years 
attained (World Bank, 2011). Many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have recently 
introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE) policies, providing tuition-free access to all 
children at government-aided (public) schools1. Previous studies have emphasized enrollment 
and grade-completion achievements, which accrued mainly to girls and children from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds who were previously unable to pay tuition fees (Deininger, 2003; 
Nishimura, et al., 2008; Lewin, 2009; Oketch and Somerset, 2010; Hoogeveen and Rossi, 2013). 
However, the quality of education has since declined and many graduating children are not 
achieving the minimum learning requirements (UNESCO, 2005). This study assesses the extent 
of the decline that is associated with the FPE policy, delineates the impacts by gender and 
socioeconomic status (SES), and examines the relevant pathways. We utilize internationally 
standardized grade six pupil-level test scores for reading and math to measure learning 
proficiency – a significant improvement on the existing studies. The study therefore, draws 
primary education policy lessons relevant to several countries from the SSA region. 
Although most studies have reported impressive participation impacts, they have also 
highlighted several challenges that were thought to compromise the quality of education in UPE 
schools. In the study on UPE impacts in Uganda, Deininger (2003) attributed the high end-of-
cycle exam failure rates in 1999 to the excessively overcrowded classes that resulted into 
                                                 
1 UPE policies were introduced in Malawi in 1994, Uganda in 1997, Tanzania in 2000, and Burundi, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda in 2003 (Grogan, 2008).  
  
extreme pupil-to-teacher ratios (PTRs). Others involve efficiency concerns such as absenteeism, 
grade repetition, and dropping out before primary cycle completion. Other – mostly qualitative – 
studies of UPE impacts on school management structures have emphasized the effects on local 
community participation and school accountability (Suzuki, 2002; Sasaoka and Nishimura, 
2010).  These studies note the centralized political power that characterizes the UPE policies in 
SSA and thus, report the significant weakening of local control of public schools and the 
reduction of community participation in school governance. Other studies have analyzed the 
school choice impacts of UPE policies and categorized the resultant decisions as reflecting either 
the demand for differentiated schooling – the differentiated demand model – or the demand for 
more schools – the excess demand model. Nishimura & Yamano (2013) find that the rapid 
emergence of private primary schools in Kenya – the number of private schools grew four-fold 
in three years after the introduction of FPE – reflected demand for higher quality schooling.  
A few studies have assessed the learning impacts of the UPE policies in SSA. Two such 
studies in Kenya were by Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabu & Sandefur (2010), and by Lucas & Mbiti 
(2012a). Both studies used grade eight primary-exit exam scores2 disaggregated at school-level 
by gender and categorized by school type and location. These studies find that the achievement 
declines that followed the introduction of FPE were induced by the peer quality decline resulting 
from the enrolment of lower ability pupils. In particular, Lucas & Mbiti (2012a) found no 
substantial declines in the test scores of pupils who would have taken the Kenya Certificate of 
Primary Education (KCPE) exam in the absence of the FPE program. Because of possible 
selection bias concerns in these studies – arising from the high-stakes nature of the grade eight 
                                                 
2 Primary-exit exams are high-stakes exams and are therefore, highly consequential for either the school or the 
pupils and in most cases, for both. As such, these exams have previously been associated with such practices as 
private tutoring, sifting, teaching to the test and even worse, cheating (Koretz, 2002; MacLeod & Urquiola, 2009; 
Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer, 2010; Figlio & Loeb, 2011). 
  
primary-exit exams – this study’s grade six pupil-level test score analysis presents an improved 
estimation of the true learning impacts of the FPE policy. 
Using a unique repeated cross-sections dataset obtained from the Southern and East 
African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ), this paper applies a before 
and after difference in differences (DIDs) approach to analyze the grade six  pupil-level learning 
impacts of FPE for both Reading and Math. By assuming a common trend and relying on the 
conditional independence assumption, we utilize private schools as a comparison group since 
these were not directly treated by the FPE intervention.  The study finds that the FPE 
intervention was associated with considerable test score declines for both subjects for pupils 
enrolled in public schools, especially for boys and in urban schools. Specifically, FPE was 
associated with reading and math test score declines of 0.415 standard deviations (SDs) and 
0.510 SDs respectively. Arising from possible competition for pupils, positive spillover effects 
were observed for elite private schools in urban areas – their math test scores improved 
significantly by 0.384 SDs. The pathway analyses for the observed pupil test score changes in 
Kenya suggest considerable importance of teachers’ efforts3. Teacher efforts significantly 
declined in public schools – by over 12 hours for reading teachers and about 13.8 hours for math 
teachers. This decline in teacher efforts mirrors the decline in local community involvement in 
school operations and in frequency of school inspection and monitoring activities.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a brief background 
explanation of the FPE policy in Kenya. The SACMEQ dataset is explained in section 3 after 
                                                 
3 We use the self-reported average number of extra hours per week that the grade six math or reading teacher spent 
on lesson preparation and grading of pupils’ assignments to infer teacher effort. These hours are in fact additional to 
the official class time the teacher is required to spend teaching.  
  
which our hypotheses and the DIDs empirical model are discussed in section 4. We present the 
results in section 5 and conclude with a policy relevant discussion and conclusion section. 
2. The FPE policy in Kenya 
In December 2002, a national coalition government was voted into power in Kenya after almost 
forty years of single party rule4. In fulfillment of a presidential campaign promise for free basic 
education for all Kenyans, the FPE policy was implemented effective January 2003. Primary 
school enrollment jumped from 5.9 million in 2002 to 7.2 million in 2003, instantly pushing the 
net enrollment ratio (NER) from 61.8% to 74.2% (see table 1).  Together with the introduction of 
FPE, a new curriculum designed to reduce both student and teacher workload was implemented 
at both primary and secondary school levels (Wanyama & Koskey, 2013).  
In June 2003, the new government embarked on a three-year “national Economic 
Recovery Strategy for wealth and employment” (ERS). As detailed in the Kenya Education 
Sector Support Program (KESSP), the ERS entailed education sector reforms that were to 
operationalize the FPE policy. In particular, the KESSP spelled out the adoption of the Sector 
Wide Approach (SWAp) for education planning, and the decentralization of education and 
training services to provincial and district levels (Government of Kenya, 2005). Several 
investment programs were undertaken, many of which focused on tackling the various 
educational challenges that had been manifested at the primary schooling level – most notably 
classroom overcrowding. The “Primary School Infrastructure Investment Program” involved the 
construction of new schools in areas where there had been none and the construction of 
                                                 
4 The Kenya African National Union (KANU) party ruled Kenya for almost forty years from the time the country 
acquired its independence (1963) from Great Britain. In 2002, the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
defeated the KANU party and assumed government leadership in January 2003.    
  
additional classrooms to alleviate on the extreme class size effects. Other interventions were 
directed at issues such as in-service teacher training, instructional materials provision, school 
health and feeding, and expanding opportunities in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs).  
Almost immediately after the introduction of FPE, parents became dissatisfied with the 
quality of education in FPE schools as they observed the extreme overcrowding effects the 
policy had generated. This disquiet was immediately reflected in the rapid emergence of private 
primary schooling in the country. In their study of the school choice decisions in rural Kenya, 
Nishimura & Yamano (2013) found that private schools in Kenya increased four-fold between 
2002 and 2005. This was despite the fact that pre-FPE, few private primary schools had existed 
in Kenya and, had traditionally offered superior quality education targeting children from 
wealthy households in urban areas. In a detailed study of the private schooling trends in four 
commonwealth countries, Tooley & Dixon (2005) highlighted the relatively newer concept of 
private schools for the poor – the so called “budget private schools”. In a report to the common 
wealth education ministers, Tooley (2007) dwelt in greater detail on these types of schools, 
noting that they targeted the poorest households in both urban and rural areas. Oketch, Mutisya, 
Ngware & Ezeh (2010) make the point that in urban areas, these budget private schools are of the 
lowest quality and are mainly located in slums where FPE schools are in short supply.  
From its inception therefore, the FPE policy was characterized by centralized political 
power. Its implementation framework was heavily biased in favor of increased physical school 
resources whose supervision and management were vested in provincial and district education 
governments.   
  
3. The SACMEQ dataset 
SACMEQ is an international non-profit organization composed of fifteen African education 
ministries working together to enhance their education planning and policy expertise through the 
use of scientific methods to monitor and evaluate the conditions and quality of schooling in the 
Eastern and Southern African region5. It is modeled in a similar manner to the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement’s (IEA) TIMSS6. The consortium 
receives technical and financial assistance from UNESCO’s International Institute for Education 
Planning (IIEP) and the government of the Netherlands respectively.  
Since 1995, SACMEQ has completed three school-based international studies (1995, 
2000 and 2007) that involved administering standardized tests in reading and mathematics for 
grade six pupils and their teachers in the fifteen member countries7. Since Kenya was involved in 
the three completed studies, we have data for both periods before and after the policy 
intervention. The SACMEQ1 (1998) survey involved testing pupils only, in one subject – 
reading. In the pre-FPE era, there were very few private primary schools in Kenya, thus no 
observations for private schools are reflected in this baseline study. The subsequent two surveys 
contain both public and private school observations for grade six pupils and their teachers, and 
test scores for both subjects. At national level, the SACMEQ survey sample schools are selected 
by first stratifying according to regions and then according to school size. Thus, a Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique is applied to ensure the selected schools reflect a 
fair representation of national shares by school type and location (Wamala, Kizito, & Jjemba, 
2013). By using the attendance register in the selected schools, a simple random sample of about 
                                                 
5 Organization’s description obtained from SACMEQ home page http://www.sacmeq.org/ on 22nd December, 2012. 
6 TIMSS is the acronym for Trends in International Mathematics and Science Studies. 
7Except for the first study (SACMEQ1) which was conducted in only seven countries - Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Zambia, Zanzibar and Zimbabwe (Nzomo, Kariuki & Guantai, 2001). The other member countries are 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda.    
  
twenty grade six pupils is generated from those present at school on the first day of the survey. 
These pupils complete the two tests and a pupil questionnaire in two days. The respective grade 
six mathematics and reading teachers also complete their respective teacher tests and a 
questionnaire. The school head teacher completes a questionnaire that solicits information on the 
school head’s characteristics and other school variables. 
For purposes of this study, we re-constructed the school location variable into two 
locations, rural and urban8. The SACMEQ datasets provide identification information up to the 
regional (province) level only, which makes it practically difficult to control for school level 
effects. For the analyses in this study, we utilized “Google Earth” to identify the relevant districts 
where the selected sample schools are located. Since the district is still a higher level of 
aggregation, we do not make a district-level panel analysis but rather, control for district 
dummies in all the regression analyzes. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering at district 
times rural/urban level.      
“Parental education” is constructed as the mean number of school-years attained by both 
parents. “Home possessions” is constructed as a non-weighted average of dummies for the 
presence of electricity, piped water, television, radio and telephone, at a pupil’s home. “School 
amenities” is constructed as a non-weighted average of eight dummy variables for the presence 
of a radio, television, staffroom, counsel room, sports ground, sick bay/first aid room, electricity, 
and kiosk/cafeteria at the school. “Community involvement” is constructed as a non-weighted 
measure of the extent to which parents (local community) are involved in school activities such 
as building classrooms and teacher houses, repair of school equipment and furniture, purchase of 
                                                 
8 Schools located in either isolated or rural areas are all grouped under “rural” and those located either near a small 
town or near a large town/city are all grouped under “urban”. Appendix A  table A1 gives labels for other variables 
used in this study’s analyses.   
  
stationary and textbooks, extra-curricular activities, assisting teachers in teaching and provision 
of school meals. We use the self-reported grade six teacher’s average number of extra hours per 
week spent on lesson preparation and grading of pupils’ assignments as a proxy for “teacher 
effort”. 
 
3.1 Descriptive evidence 
 
The pooled sample for all the three surveys involves 10,968 pupils, 1070 teachers, and 563 head 
teachers in 563 schools from all the eight provinces covering 57 year-2000 Kenya districts. The 
respective pupil sample shares for the first, second and third surveys are 30%, 30% and 40%. 
Whereas for the first two surveys the rural-urban shares are fairly balanced at 55% - 45%, the 
post-FPE survey share is heavily biased in favor of rural – 62%. For the 2000 and 2007 surveys, 
the proportions of pupils enrolled in private are 5% and 10% respectively. Tables 2, 3 and 4 
report the descriptive summaries for important variables by school type and location.  
Table 2 shows a summary of our main dependent variable, the standardized grade six 
pupil test scores for reading and math. In 1998, the country achieved an average test score of 
0.43 SDs in reading , which was significantly higher than the SACMEQ regional mean. As 
illustrated in figure 1, the next survey – two years later – realized a moderate increase in reading 
test scores for public schools by 0.04 SDs. This positive pre-FPE trend was achieved during a 
period when the NER also increased three percentage points – from 62 percent to 65 percent – 
and average wealth (home possessions) declined for pupils from both rural and urban households 
(see table 3). This improvement in reading test scores is consistent with the observed increase in 
teacher effort – teacher extra hours for the period significantly increased in both rural and urban 
  
public schools by over seven hours. Between 2000 and 2007 however, test scores declined by 
0.22 SDs and 0.19 SDs respectively for reading and math in public schools. This decline is also 
consistent with both the observed significant decline in teacher effort – teacher extra hours 
declined by at least five hours – and the significant decline in the measure for community 
involvement (see table 4). Assuming a similar across-periods trend for public schools, these test 
score changes suggest that FPE was associated with a 0.26 SDs (0.04 + 0.22) decline in reading 
test scores. However, this conclusion might be misleading for several reasons. First, this decline 
reflects mean test score differences for public schools only. To ascertain the true impact of the 
intervention requires an appropriate comparison group. Second, since the FPE intervention was 
never implemented as a randomized trial, it is important to control for other relevant 
determinants of learning achievement in order to isolate the FPE effect using the conditional 
independence assumption. We report FPE effects that take these two concerns into consideration 
in section 5.1.  
Important pupil-level variables in our analyses include age, gender, parental education, 
home possessions, and regularity of meals. From table 3, grade six pupils in private schools are 
younger than their peers in public schools by close to one year both before and after the 
intervention. This could have been due to the higher incidence of grade repetition in public 
schools – 60% as opposed to 48% in year 2000. Although grade repetition remained higher in 
public schools after 2003, it considerably declined across all schools when compared to the pre-
FPE era. Concerning parental education and the measure for home possessions, private school 
pupils came from higher SES households in the pre-FPE era. However, by 2007 the public 
schools had considerably bridged the gap on both indicators. Although parents’ education 
generally declined during the period, the greatest decline – 2.33 years – was observed in private 
  
schools. This decline in parental education for private schools could be related to pupil transfers 
or even, to new enrolments into private schools for the poor as suggested by Nishimura & 
Yamano (2013) and Oketch et al., (2010) respectively. Similarly, whereas there was no 
significant change in the household wealth measure for private schools, the public school pupils’ 
wealth measure significantly increased. This across-schools general improvement in SES 
measures is consistent with the Kenya demographic and health survey (DHS) trends between 
2003 and 2008 that showed average improvements in housing characteristics, access to safe 
drinking water and availability of certain durable consumer goods in the households (Kenya 
DHS report, 2003; Kenya DHS report, 2008). From table 4, pupils’ gender composition at both 
school and grade six attainment levels remained fairly balanced both before and after the 
intervention. Consistent with the other SES variables explained earlier, the indicator variable for 
pupils who  had at least two daily meals – regular meals – shows a greater decline in this 
proportion for grade six pupils in private schools than in public schools.        
4.  Hypotheses and the DIDs model 
The study’s main objectives are to estimate the FPE impacts on learning attainment as measured 
by grade six pupils’ standardized reading and math test scores, delineate them by gender and 
SES, and establish the pathways through which the test scores were affected. 
Considering the achievement declines that had followed the introduction of UPE in 
Uganda (Deininger, 2003; Nishimura, Yamano & Sasaoka, 2008), the FPE policy in Kenya 
ought to have involved default measures targeted at preventing major learning declines. First, 
since the policy abolished tuition fees payments as a precondition for enrolment, it was expected 
to attract children from poor households whose parents were less or not educated. For such 
  
children, FPE schools represented the only avenue of acquiring important skills and thus, they 
required extra effort from teachers and school administrators to ensure effective learning 
attainment. Also, to the extent that SES is a good indicator of inheritable parents’ innate ability, 
such children would have been expected to have lower levels of ability and possibly, motivation 
for learning. Second, the elimination of the requirement for parents to pay tuition fees would 
have been expected to distance them and the local community from the school. This could result 
from the deliberate actions of school administrators that would  effectively block parents’ 
attempts to remain involved or, from parents’ loss of interest in playing the school-monitoring 
role due to lack of a direct financial stake in the school. FPE schools would therefore, be less 
supervised at the local level and this would make teachers and school administrators less 
accountable for pupils’ learning outcomes. Third, the overcrowding effects resulting from fee 
elimination, especially in urban areas, would be expected to negatively affect learning 
attainment. In this case, top-tier public schools in urban areas would be expected to experience 
the worst overcrowding effects since such schools would be a target for previously privately 
enrolled pupils (Lucas & Mbiti, 2012b). Another line of argument that would tend to predict 
quality declines after the introduction of FPE relates to the public service delivery deficiencies 
and institutional weaknesses that exist in many developing countries - the Ugandan experience of 
local capture of UPE funds (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004) and others9. It would have been 
reasonable to expect that these occurrences were likely to befall the FPE policy – as the 
intervention also involved political empowerment of the provincial and district education bodies. 
Moreover, at the time of the FPE policy introduction, Kenya’s public sector was perceived to be 
                                                 
9 In Uganda’s case, the UPE program suffered the effects of a corruption and embezzlement scandal in which 
excessive amounts of UPE funds were misappropriated. The report of the commission of inquiry into the 
mismanagement of UPE and USE (2012) funds attributed the scandal to corruption, fraud and embezzlement; poor 
supervision, monitoring and maintenance of school building projects; existence of ghost pupils, teachers and 
schools; etc. A copy of this report was obtained from www.education.go.ug on 6th February, 2013. 
  
at least as corrupt as Uganda’s10. Indeed, the KESSP forensic audit of 2010 unearthed huge 
misappropriations of FPE funds meant for the KESSP projects for the period 2005-2009.  
From the foregoing arguments, this study proposes three hypotheses. First, the FPE 
policy in Kenya was expected to result into significant school quality declines that would result 
in pupil test score declines. Second, the policy would be expected to disfavor children from 
lower SES households who mainly enroll in rural schools and, possibly to worsen the gender gap 
in learning achievement. Third,  the intervention was expected to lead to reduced local 
community involvement in schools thereby making FPE schools less accountable to their local 
communities. The resultant reduction in local supervision and monitoring would be reflected 
through teacher behavior, thus we expect significant reduction in teacher effort. 
4.1 The DIDs estimation approach 
We estimate the reduced form impacts of the FPE policy in Kenya. As in Glewwe & Kremer 
(2006), our main education outcome variable is the pupil’s test score for either reading or math. 
We exploit the pre- and post-intervention nature of the 2000 and 2007 datasets to identify the 
impacts of the policy by comparing public and private schools in a Difference in Differences 
(DIDs) setup using two repeated cross sections.  For impacts identification, we assume a 
common trend for the main outcome variable across periods and between school types. As 
illustrated for reading test scores (see figure 1), our analyses suffer from lack of data for private 
schools in the 1998 survey. However, since the few private schools that existed in the pre-FPE 
era were mostly in urban areas and targeted children from higher SES households, it is 
reasonable to assume that their pre-intervention test scores were always higher than for public 
                                                 
10Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) rank for Kenya in 2002 and 2003 was 96 out of 
102 countries and 122 out of 133 countries respectively. In contrast, Uganda’s CPI ranks for the two years were 
better than Kenya’s at 93 and 113 respectively (information retrieved from http://archive.transparency.org on 6th 
June, 2014).  
  
schools. Second, since this study utilizes observational data generated from a non-randomized 
policy intervention we control for important pupil-level variables in our main regression analyses 
and thus rely on the CIA to identify the policy effects. This equates to assuming that sorting into 
public and private schools is as good as random conditional on the pupil-level variables that we 
control for (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Because we do not observe the child’s innate ability and 
motivation for schooling, our results can be interpreted as overstating (understating) the negative 
(positive) learning impacts of the FPE intervention. However, in their study of school choices 
and students’ achievements, Glewwe & Jacoby (1994) did not find significant evidence of innate 
ability related selection biases in the school choice problem involving Ghanaian middle school 
students. 
Nishimura & Yamano (2013)’s study in rural Kenya identify important school choice 
determinants as those variables relating to the child’s home background – specifically household 
wealth and the child’s gender. We test the CIA by estimating a school choice equation specified 
in equation (1) below: 
Pr(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 = 1) = 𝛿0 +  𝛿𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛿𝑅𝑅𝑗 + 𝛿𝐹𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) +  𝛿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝐶𝐹(𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡) +
∑ {𝛼𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑗 + 𝛼𝑑𝑅(𝐼𝑑𝑗 ∗  𝑅𝑗)}𝑑∈𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                                      (1)  
for pupil i in school j, at time t. 
Where Private is the dummy for private school, it takes 1 if private and 0 if public; FPE is a 
dummy for year 2007; R is a dummy for a rural school; C is a vector for child attributes; Idj is a 
district dummy which takes 1 if school j is located in district d; D is a set of survey districts; and 
εijt is the idiosyncratic estimation error term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
  
In table 5, we report the regression estimates from the linear probability model (LPM) in 
equation (1). Consistent with earlier studies that highlight the swift emergence of private 
schooling in the post-FPE era, we find that the probability of attending a private school increased 
by 27% points after the intervention. This increase was bigger in urban than in rural areas by 
4.7% points – this too is consistent with the fact that people in rural areas mostly enroll their 
children in public schools. We also get the expected signs on the two most important selection 
variables - home possessions and parents’ education. Wealthier households and more educated 
parents are more likely to have their grade six children enrolled in private schools. An interesting 
finding is that parental education became a significant determinant of private enrolment after the 
intervention. We also find that though home possessions remained an important determinant of 
private enrolment, their degree of importance reduced after the introduction of FPE. These 
results are consistent with the “private schools for the poor” phenomenon highlighted by Tooley 
& Dixon (2005) and Tooley (2007). We argue therefore, that controlling for these home 
background variables considerably reduces the potential estimation bias that would likely arise 
from the lack of an explicit measure of the child’s innate ability.  
 
4.1.1 Impacts on pupil test scores 
Our main analyses involve the estimation of a reduced form education production function 
described in Glewwe & Kremer (2006) and shown in equation (2) below: 
A=a (C, H, EP, α),                                                                                                  (2) 
Where A represents the pupil’s cognitive skills measured as standardized test scores, C a vector 
of the child’s various characteristics such as age and gender, H a vector of the child’s home 
characteristics including parents’ education and other SES measures, and EP (education policy) a 
  
dummy that equals 1 for year 2007 indicating a period after the FPE policy had been 
implemented. α is a measure of the child’s unobserved variables – mainly relating to innate 
ability and motivation for schooling. To estimate this production function, we follow the 
specification given in equation (3) below: 
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑃(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅(𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) +
∑ {𝛼𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑗 + 𝛼𝑑𝑅(𝐼𝑑𝑗 ∗  𝑅𝑗)}𝑑∈𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,       (3)  
For pupil i, in school j, at time t. 
Where Z is the standardized reading or mathematics pupil test score; P is a dummy for a public 
school; FPE is a dummy for year 2007; R is a dummy for a rural school; C is a vector for pupil 
characteristics; Idj is a district dummy which takes 1 if school j is located in district d; D is a set 
of survey districts; and εijt is the idiosyncratic estimation error term. Standard errors are adjusted 
by clustering at district times rural/urban level. 
Using equation (3), we can estimate the overall differential impacts in public schools and 
the spillover impacts for private schools. A negative and significant coefficient of main interest 
𝛽𝐹𝑃 would provide a differential measure of the learning declines in public schools resulting 
from the policy. A fully saturated model – equation (4) – is estimated to ascertain heterogeneous 
policy impacts by school location – rural versus urban. 
𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑃(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽𝐹𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑃(𝑅𝑗 ∗  𝑃𝑗) +
 𝛽𝐹𝑅𝑃( 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗  𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑅(𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) + ∑ {𝛼𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑗 +  𝛼𝑑𝑅(𝐼𝑑𝑗 ∗  𝑅𝑗)}𝑑∈𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,(4)  
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated separately for girls and boys in order to ascertain the 
heterogeneous gender effects of the intervention. 
  
4.1.2 Pathways analyses 
To estimate the intervention impacts on the various pupil-level pathways, we utilize several 
variants of equations (3) and (4) in which only the dependent variable changes. Estimation of the 
impacts on grade six teacher-related pathways and all the other school-level pathways is depicted 
in equations (5) and (6) shown below.  
𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑗 +  𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑃(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑗 +  𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑅(𝑆𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) +
∑ {𝛼𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑗 + 𝛼𝑑𝑅(𝐼𝑑𝑗 ∗  𝑅𝑗)}𝑑∈𝐷 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡,           (5)  
For school j, at time t. 
Where Q is a measure for school quality or community involvement; P is a dummy for public 
school; FPE is a dummy for year 2007; R is a dummy for a rural school; S is a vector for grade 
six teacher characteristics (appears only in teacher pathways regressions); Idj is a district dummy 
which takes 1 if school j is located in district d; D is a set of survey districts; and εjt is the 
idiosyncratic estimation error term. Standard errors are adjusted by clustering at district times 
rural/urban level. Equation (6) enables the delineation of the school-level pathways analyses by 
location – rural versus urban. 
𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑗 +  𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑃(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽𝐹𝑅(𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) + 𝛽𝑅𝑃(𝑅𝑗 ∗  𝑃𝑗) +
 𝛽𝐹𝑅𝑃( 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∗  𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑗) +  𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑅(𝑆𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑗) + ∑ {𝛼𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑗 +  𝛼𝑑𝑅(𝐼𝑑𝑗 ∗  𝑅𝑗)}𝑑∈𝐷 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡,    (6)  
The coefficients of main interest in equations (4) and (6) are 𝛽𝐹, 𝛽𝐹𝑃, 𝛽𝐹𝑅, and 𝛽𝐹𝑅𝑃 . We 
carry out joint hypothesis tests to establish the Average Treatment Effects (ATE) on public rural 
schools, public urban schools, private rural schools, and private urban schools. We ascertain 
whether these impacts are different between rural and urban schools by comparing within rural 
  
schools – public rural versus private rural -, and within urban schools – public urban versus 
private urban.   
5. Results 
5.1 Impacts on learning 
Although grade six is mostly the last or penultimate class in primary schools for most of the 
SACMEQ member countries, it is the third last grade of primary schooling in Kenya (Nzomo et 
al. 2001). Since the 2007 grade six cohort were exposed to FPE for only five years, our findings 
underestimate the full FPE impacts and are thus considered initial impacts. The main results – 
equations (3) and (4) – are reported in tables 6 and 7. Preferred results appear in the third 
columns where we take care of all possible bias concerns – we control for child specific 
characteristics, family background and school location area specificities. We find that FPE was 
associated with large learning achievement declines of 0.415 SDs and 0.510 SDs in reading and 
math respectively. More detailed analyses (table 7) reveal that these impacts were predominantly 
in urban schools11 - reading test scores in urban public schools declined by 0.492 SDs while 
math scores declined by 0.606 SDs. As shown in the appendix table B1, these learning declines 
in urban areas resulted from a combination of absolute learning deteriorations in public schools 
with significant learning improvements in private schools. This suggests that the FPE policy had 
a positive spillover effect on learning achievement in private schools located in urban areas12. 
This is thought to have resulted from the stiff competition for pupils that these schools 
                                                 
11 Summarized impacts from table 7 are reported in appendix B table B1. The differential impacts for rural public 
schools are shown in row (g) while for urban public schools in row (h). 
12 Although the absolute learning impacts on private schools in rural areas were not statistically significant, we may 
not rule out negative spillover effects on these schools. These effects might result from the rapid emergence of 
private schools for the poor – which are thought to be offering lower quality education.  
  
experienced after previously elite public schools dispensed with the requirement for tuition fees 
after the introduction of FPE.  
An alternative explanation for the test score declines for the 2007 survey might be that 
these tests were more difficult than in 2000. If this was the case, then our findings may not 
reflect the true FPE learning effect but rather that grade six pupils in Kenya fell behind their 
counterparts in other SACMEQ countries13. Yet, because these pupil-level test scores are 
standardized, the level of difficulty of the tests has no significant influence on our findings.    
Table 8 shows the learning outcomes estimated separately for girls and boys14.  This 
analysis suggests heterogeneous gender impacts of the FPE policy. Statistically significant 
learning declines were experienced by boys in urban public schools – reading test scores 
declined by 0.588 SDs while math declines were larger at 0.739 SDs. On the other hand, the 
differences in girls’ learning achievements between public and private urban schools were not 
significant, thus suggesting that FPE did not have a significant impact on the learning gender-gap 
in Kenyan primary schools. The decline in boy’s learning achievement is mostly explained by 
the positive spillover effect for private schools15.  
5.2 Pathways to learning impacts 
The pathways regressions are reflected in tables 9 – 13. Pupil absenteeism is estimated to have 
significantly decreased in public schools post-FPE – the proportion of grade six pupils who had 
been absent at least once in the month preceding the survey decreased by 37.5% points. We find 
no significant differential impacts on grade repetition and on availability of basic education 
                                                 
13 The dependent variables in our learning achievement analyses (pupil-level reading and math test scores) are 
standardized deviations from the SACMEQ regional mean test scores. 
14 Appendix table B2 gives the summarized test score impacts by pupil gender. 
15 We hope to publish a separate study on the gender impacts of the FPE policy in Kenya using the SACMEQ 
dataset.  
  
materials such as pens, exercise books and geometry sets. Table 10 shows the grade six reading 
and math teacher pathways – teacher test score, teacher effort and frequency of giving in-class 
written tests. We find no significant differential impacts on grade six teachers’ test scores and 
testing frequency for both subjects. On teacher effort however, reading teachers’ extra hours 
decreased by twelve hours while the decrease for math teachers was even larger at over thirteen 
hours. We analyze the grade six teacher efforts by school location in table 11. The findings on 
teacher efforts are consistent with our findings on pupil test scores. Large teacher effort declines 
occurred in urban schools and resulted from a combination of absolute declines in public schools 
and positive spillover effects in private schools (see appendix table B3). An alternative 
explanation for the teacher effort declines might be the curriculum changes that were 
implemented simultaneously with the FPE policy. However, we find that the absolute teacher 
effort reductions were quite large representing about 28% decline for reading teachers and over 
40% decline for math teachers – these effort reductions represent more than double the 
proportionate falls in the official weekly teacher workloads.  
In tables 12 and 13 we show the estimations for other school-level pathways16. We find 
no significant differential impacts on the pupil-to-teacher ratios (PTR), the proportions of classes 
held in the open air, school amenities, and teacher absenteeism. On the number of inspections 
carried out at the school in the two years preceding the survey, we find significant declines in 
public schools only. This finding suggests that district/provincial authorities did less monitoring 
and supervision activities in public schools after the introduction of FPE. Concerning local 
community involvement in school operations, we find that FPE was associated with significant 
decreases in this measure for public schools. The declines in local community involvement 
                                                 
16 Appendix table B4 gives the summarized impacts for the school pathway variables – school inspections and local 
community involvement. 
  
mirrored the declines in grade six teacher efforts and in pupil test scores. An alternative 
explanation of this finding might be that the community involvement variable merely reflects the 
elimination of tuition fees in public schools. If this is true, then this variable says nothing about 
the local community’s role in teacher efforts rather that, teacher efforts declined in public 
schools because of reductions in teacher payments resulting from the abolition of mandatory 
tuition fees payments. First, like in many other countries in SSA, public school teachers in Kenya 
are recruited and paid by the central government through the ministry of education, science and 
technology (MOEST). Second, as defined in section 3, our measure for local community 
involvement includes activities that do not involve any payments by parents to the schools.      
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The FPE policy in Kenya outlawed mandatory tuition fees payments for enrolment into public 
primary schools since January 2003. The objective was to ensure an opportunity for every 
Kenyan to attain basic education. Through this study, we have assessed the impacts of this policy 
using grade six pupils’ learning achievements in two important areas of cognitive development – 
literacy and numeracy. Contrary to the existing literature that has highlighted the enrollment 
benefits of the intervention, we find that conditional on reaching grade six, the intervention was 
initially associated with large declines in learning achievements for both reading and math. 
These declines were most pronounced in urban areas where, because of competition for pupils, 
the quality of private schools significantly improved. We found decreases in local community 
involvement in school operations, which resulted into reduced school supervision and monitoring 
that was reflected through large reductions in teacher effort.  
  
Even though the community involvement measure used in this study encompasses a very 
limited scope17 - mainly education materials procurements and school infrastructure 
improvements – the impacts on teacher effort are quite large and highly significant. Using the 
example of the EDUCO program in El Salvador (Jimenez & Sawada, 2014), we would expect 
even larger effects if community involvement in Kenya involved some direct teacher behavior 
monitoring roles. This study did not decipher the causal direction of the involvement decline in 
public schools – it is possible that parents were sidelined from active involvement or that they 
simply lost interest after the abolition of tuition fee payments, or both. Therefore, empirical 
studies to supplement the exploratory qualitative work by Nishimura, et al (2009) are needed to 
enhance our understanding of how to increase teacher efforts and improve pupil learning 
outcomes. Such studies would also seek to ascertain parents’ valuation of the returns to their  
children’s education achievements.    
6.1 Conclusion 
As the millennium development goals (MDGs) get replaced by the forthcoming sustainable 
development goals (SDGs) in the post-2015 development framework, the new target for 
education development needs to reflect one of the major challenges to meaningful universal 
education attainment – low learning achievements. This study has quantified the learning 
attainment declines that were associated with a UPE policy implemented in Kenya, and 
identified an important policy-relevant pathway. The analysis reveals that to achieve cognitive 
development through universal primary education policies in some countries of SSA will require 
the active involvement of all stakeholders – more critically, local communities need to be 
                                                 
17 Our measure for community involvement was dictated by the SACMEQ questionnaire structure. A review of 
previous school based management (SBM) studies reveals that SBM programs involve devolution of authority and 
responsibility over various aspects of school operations to a specific individual or group of people (Barrera-Osorio, 
et al. 2009).   
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Gross Enrolment Rate 91.6 106.9 
Net Enrolment Rate 61.8 74.2 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 34.4 38.0 
Girls share 48.4 48.5 
Net Enrolment for Girls 62.1 74.2 
Net Enrolment for Boys 61.6 74.2 





Pupil Standardized Test Score Summaries and Mean Differences   








Public 0.43 0.04* 0.47 -0.22*** 0.60 -0.19*** 
Private   1.07 0.02 1.13 0.18* 
Diff.   -0.62 -0.22 -0.53 -0.36 
Rural  0.27 0.09*** 0.36 -0.22*** 0.56 -0.18*** 
Urban 0.65 0.01 0.67 -0.04 0.74 -0.02 
Diff. -0.38 0.09 -0.30 -0.22 -0.18 -0.18 
Source: Author’s own computations from Kenya’s SACMEQ 1, 2 and 3 datasets 




Descriptive Statistics and Mean Differences – Pupil, Teacher and School Variables 
Variable mean 1998 Diff: 2000-1998  Diff: 2007-2000 
 Public Rural Urban Public Rural Urban 
Private 
(mean 2000) Public Private Rural Urban 
Pupil Age 
(years) 13.75 14.07 13.31 0.07 -0.09* 0.24*** 12.93 -0.03 0.02 -0.16*** 0.01 
 
Repeat dummy 0.62 0.69 0.52 -0.02* -0.03* -0.03 0.48 -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.09*** 
 
Parent education 8.16 7.38 9.23 0.07 0.62*** -0.62*** 10.61 -1.68*** -2.33*** -1.50*** -1.61*** 
 
Scholastics 3.49 3.42 3.58 -0.17*** -0.13** -0.23*** 4.08 -0.79*** -1.09*** -0.79*** -0.77*** 
Home 
Possessions 0.38 0.29 0.48 -0.09*** -0.03*** -0.16*** 0.64 0.21*** 0.00 0.17*** 0.26*** 
Teacher extra 
hours 10.39 11.11 9.77 8.11*** 7.45*** 8.65*** 20.56 -6.31*** -6.61 -6.66*** -5.47*** 
Weekly written 
test 0.57 0.65 0.49 0.14*** 0.06 0.19*** 0.67 -0.39*** -0.29 -0.39*** -0.37*** 
 
Weekly load 35.02 36.57 33.69 4.58*** 3.91*** 4.69*** 39.33 -3.92*** -8.86*** -4.96*** -3.77** 
School 
Amenities 0.43 0.36 0.53 0.00 0.03* -0.04 0.51 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 
 
School Size 564.60 452.9 713 -27.10 20.14 -75.42 426.6 48.30 4.31 47.58 85.46 
Pupil-Teacher 
ratio 32.72 33.67 31.46 1.54 0.89 2.37 26.07 10.14*** 1.56 9.59*** 7.42*** 
 
Complete classes 0.80 0.72 0.92 0.05* 0.09** 0.00 0.96 -0.03 -0.19** -0.03 -0.04 
Incomplete 
classes 0.18 0.25 0.07 -0.05* -0.09** 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.21** 0.04 0.04 
Source: Author’s own computations from Kenya’s SACMEQ 1, 2 and 3 datasets. *** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance 
  
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Mean Differences – Pupil, Teacher and School Variables 
Variable mean 2000 Diff: 2007-2000 
 Public Private Rural Urban Public Private Rural Urban 
Speaks English 
outside school 0.88 0.95 0.86 0.91 0.03*** -0.01 0.03*** 0.04*** 
 
Takes Extra lessons 0.86 0.74 0.87 0.83 -0.18*** -0.04 -0.20*** -0.13*** 
 
Repeating grade six 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.11 -0.02*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.01 
 
Absent last month 0.47 -0.00 0.48 0.42 -0.18*** 0.25*** -0.16*** -0.19*** 
 
Homework help 0.87 0.89 0.83 0.91 -0.04*** -0.07** -0.02** -0.05*** 
 
Regular meals 0.85 0.93 0.82 0.88 -0.04*** -0.16*** -0.01 -0.09*** 
Teacher test-score 
(read) 0.69 0.81 0.69 0.69 -0.07 0.03 -0.12 0.04 
Teacher test-score 
(math) 1.47 2.04 1.57 1.41 -0.48*** -0.89* -0.54*** -0.43*** 
 
New reading teacher 0.13 0.56 0.19 0.09 0.17*** 0.13 0.15** 0.23*** 
 
New math teacher 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.06 
 
years trained (read) 2.05 2.11 2.08 2.03 0.04 -0.59 -0.19* 0.26** 
 
years trained (math) 2.09 1.88 2.15 1.99 0.00 -0.61 -0.10 -0.04 
termly evaluation 
(read) 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
termly evaluation 
(math) 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.11** -0.01 0.09* 0.08 
 
School inspections 15 9.38 14.32 15.33 -9.88*** -2.43 -9.42*** -9.33*** 
Community 
involvement 15.72 13.13 16.01 15.09 -4.12*** -1.23 -4.51*** -3.23*** 
Community 
importance 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.16 -0.12*** -0.11 -0.14*** -0.12** 
Head teacher 
experience (years) 20.32 17.50 19.61 20.96 1.15* -2.66 0.59 0.95 
Permanent teachers' 
proportion 0.95 0.85 0.95 0.93 -0.07*** -0.25 -0.10*** -0.08** 
Female teachers' 
proportion 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.57 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.04 
Female students' 
proportion 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.01 -0.06 -0.00 0.03 
 
Grade six size 67.32 58.25 53.54 84.32 4.88 60.91 -1.08 35.29** 
Female grade six 
proportion 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.48 -0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 
Source: Author’s own computations from Kenya’s SACMEQ 2 and 3 datasets. 




Determinants of Private School Choice – A Linear Probability Model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Private Private Private 
2007 dummy 0.0713*** 0.242*** 0.274*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0639) (0.0640) 
Rural School -0.0723*** -0.0297*** -0.0357** 
   (0.0112)  (0.0107) (0.0155) 
2007 x Rural -0.0485*** -0.0529*** -0.0468*** 
  (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0154) 
Age in years  -0.00863*** -0.00549* 
   (0.00299) (0.00298) 
2007 x Age  -0.00713* -0.00799** 
   (0.00399) (0.00392) 
Girl  -0.00982 -0.00162 
   (0.00926) (0.00896) 
2007 x Girl  -0.00570 -0.00842 
   (0.0134) (0.0128) 
Home Possessions  0.467*** 0.442*** 
   (0.0403) (0.0374) 
2007 x Possessions  -0.315*** -0.314*** 
   (0.0462) (0.0429) 
Parental Education  0.000851 0.000644 
   (0.00110) (0.00111) 
2007 x Parent Educ.  0.00377** 0.00414** 
   (0.00178) (0.00177) 
Regular Meals  -0.00358 0.00588 
   (0.0109) (0.0111) 
2007 x Reg. Meals  -0.0341** -0.0535*** 
   (0.0163) (0.0162) 
Constant 0.105*** 0.0559 0.0121 
  (0.0101) (0.0468) (0.0473) 
District x Rural 
dummies No No Yes 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 
R-squared 0.036 0.109 0.222 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis 









Impacts of FPE on Pupils’ Standardized Test Scores 
  Reading Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Public school -0.623** -0.206 -0.177 -0.526** -0.250 -0.216 
 (0.260) (0.154) (0.183) (0.213) (0.153) (0.173) 
2007 dummy 0.0204 0.0499 0.105 0.175 0.194 0.262 
 (0.309) (0.192) (0.213) (0.254) (0.199) (0.213) 
2007 x Public -0.241 -0.350* -0.415** -0.362 -0.424** -0.510** 
 (0.308) (0.183) (0.204) (0.253) (0.191) (0.206) 
Rural school  0.258 -0.0297  0.411 -0.00542 
  (0.513) (0.593)  (0.474) (0.545) 
Constant 1.074*** 1.832*** 1.794*** 1.125*** 1.621*** 1.575*** 
 (0.267) (0.555) (0.573) (0.219) (0.513) (0.525) 
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
District x Rural 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 
R-squared 0.071 0.207 0.291 0.078 0.163 0.233 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 

















Impacts of FPE on Pupils’ Standardized Test Scores – saturated model 
 Reading Math 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Public school -0.421 -0.102 -0.102 -0.406 -0.183 -0.183 
 (0.336) (0.187) (0.188) (0.273) (0.184) (0.185) 
2007 dummy 0.232 0.202 0.202 0.401 0.384* 0.384* 
 (0.410) (0.217) (0.218) (0.312) (0.229) (0.230) 
2007 x Public -0.369 -0.492** -0.492** -0.550* -0.606*** -0.606*** 
 (0.417) (0.195) (0.195) (0.308) (0.199) (0.200) 
Rural School 0.0818 0.616 1.553** 0.0731 0.711 1.644** 
 (0.490) (0.650) (0.689) (0.414) (0.617) (0.626) 
2007 x Rural -0.571 -0.452 -0.492 -0.609 -0.536 -0.514 
 (0.610) (0.387) (0.496) (0.503) (0.403) (0.474) 
Rural x Public -0.367 -0.337 -0.440 -0.230 -0.231 -0.261 
 (0.470) (0.282) (0.403) (0.397) (0.302) (0.377) 
2007 x Rural x Public 0.479 0.439 0.463 0.569 0.522 0.470 
 (0.608) (0.372) (0.488) (0.498) (0.385) (0.468) 
Constant 1.047*** 1.715*** 1.715*** 1.102*** 1.513*** 1.513*** 
 (0.357) (0.573) (0.576) (0.289) (0.527) (0.529) 
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
District x Rural 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 
R-squared 0.105 0.208 0.292 0.094 0.166 0.234 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis  
*** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance. 




























Impacts of FPE on Pupils’ Standardized Test Scores – by gender 
  Girls Boys 
 reading math reading math 
Public school -0.113 -0.190 -0.119 -0.202 
  (0.235) (0.203) (0.146) (0.180) 
2007 dummy -0.0485 0.170 0.359* 0.522** 
  (0.275) (0.240) (0.182) (0.243) 
2007 x Public -0.304 -0.394 -0.588*** -0.739*** 
  (0.275) (0.241) (0.163) (0.227) 
Rural school 1.614** 1.631** 1.680*** 1.800*** 
  (0.794) (0.646) (0.593) (0.633) 
2007 x Rural 0.0795 -0.0420 -1.050*** -0.915** 
  (0.603) (0.530) (0.337) (0.406) 
Rural x Public -0.253 -0.146 -0.760*** -0.458* 
  (0.497) (0.442) (0.198) (0.254) 
2007 x Rural x Public -0.0815 -0.00454 0.994*** 0.878** 
  (0.606) (0.534) (0.337) (0.413) 
Constant 1.740*** 1.312** 1.693*** 1.510*** 
  (0.635) (0.502) (0.528) (0.564) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dist. x Rural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,910 2,910 3,048 3,048 
R-squared 0.347 0.265 0.280 0.218 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 










Impacts of FPE on Pupil Absenteeism, Repetition and Scholastics  
  Absent dummy Repeat dummy Scholastics 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Public school 0.397*** 0.380*** 0.00167 -0.00631 -0.488*** -0.459*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0483) (0.0668) (0.0863) (0.178) (0.161) 
2007 dummy 0.229*** 0.196*** -0.166** -0.160* -0.937*** -0.948*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0533) (0.0743) (0.0947) (0.275) (0.280) 
2007 x Public -0.386*** -0.375*** 0.0408 0.0461 0.0781 0.0693 
 (0.0381) (0.0571) (0.0765) (0.0954) (0.268) (0.274) 
Rural school -0.181 -0.277 0.171 0.211 -0.158 -0.862** 
 (0.193) (0.195) (0.198) (0.213) (0.317) (0.339) 
Constant 0.0151 0.0340 -0.781*** -0.777*** 3.822*** 3.806*** 
 (0.161) (0.169) (0.164) (0.172) (0.307) (0.293) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District x Rural 
dummies 
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5,079 5,079 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 
R-squared 0.059 0.081 0.098 0.127 0.248 0.307 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
*** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance 
Other controls: Pupil’s age, gender, meals, home possessions and parental education 
Table 10 
Impacts of FPE on Teacher’s Test Score, Effort, and Testing Frequency 
  Reading Teacher Math teacher 
 Test score Effort Test Test score Effort Test 
Public school -0.493 8.300** 0.0519 -0.747*** 9.389*** -0.0101 
 (0.381) (3.764) (0.322) (0.148) (3.549) (0.261) 
2007 dummy -0.236 5.436 -0.346 -0.913*** 5.932* 0.224 
 (0.584) (4.067) (0.329) (0.297) (3.411) (0.300) 
2007 x Public 0.272 -12.10*** -0.125 0.357 -13.80*** -0.295 
 (0.591) (4.450) (0.337) (0.322) (4.218) (0.310) 
Rural school -1.464*** 3.635 -0.765** -1.258*** 7.152 -0.599* 
 (0.530) (5.309) (0.364) (0.358) (5.082) (0.320) 
Constant 1.213** 14.76*** 0.518 2.017*** 8.780* 0.514* 
 (0.531) (5.005) (0.342) (0.314) (4.840) (0.286) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District x Rural 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 298 298 298 298 298 298 
R-squared 0.186 0.287 0.404 0.246 0.333 0.305 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 










Impacts of FPE on Grade six Teacher Effort – saturated model  
  Reading teacher Math teacher 
 Effort Effort 
Public school 7.657* 10.44** 
 (4.081) (4.811) 
2007 dummy 7.987* 7.217* 
 (4.575) (4.064) 
2007 x Public -12.42** -14.61*** 
 (4.845) (5.448) 
Rural School 1.230 8.329 
 (5.929) (6.698) 
2007 x Rural -9.251 -4.624 
 (6.782) (6.732) 
Rural x Public 0.266 -4.077 
 (6.040) (6.006) 
2007 x Rural x Public 4.832 3.765 
 (8.094) (8.608) 
Constant 15.43*** 7.666 
 (4.757) (5.814) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
District x Rural 
dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 298 298 
R-squared 0.294 0.333 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 














 Impacts of FPE on Other School Quality Measures and Community Involvement  
 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 












Public school 9.210*** -0.115 0.0868 0.0286 18.45*** -0.303*** 4.679*** -0.667*** 0.628*** 0.0392 
 (3.082) (0.192) (0.146) (0.0620) (3.809) (0.0880) (0.467) (0.116) (0.135) (0.0287) 
2007 dummy -3.451 -0.275 0.255 0.0197 8.322 -0.114 1.715* -0.280 0.283 -0.00248 
 (3.060) (0.245) (0.210) (0.0593) (5.086) (0.107) (1.003) (0.220) (0.236) (0.0225) 
2007 x Public -6.232** 0.252 -0.225 -0.0264 0.739 0.133 -5.479*** 0.159 -0.183 0.0241 
 (2.790) (0.237) (0.202) (0.0643) (5.340) (0.116) (0.953) (0.243) (0.258) (0.0402) 
Rural School 4.752* -0.0463 0.0282 0.0181 34.03*** -0.420*** 6.181*** -1.109*** 1.129*** -0.0200 
 (2.800) (0.196) (0.150) (0.0594) (3.649) (0.0853) (0.428) (0.108) (0.128) (0.0216) 
Constant 7.248** 1.046*** -0.0282 -0.0181 15.47*** 0.795*** 10.82*** 1.109*** -0.129 0.0200 
 (2.800) (0.196) (0.150) (0.0594) (3.649) (0.0853) (0.428) (0.108) (0.128) (0.0216) 
District x Rural 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 




Impacts of FPE on Other School Quality Measures – Inspections and Local  Community Involvement 
 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis 









 Inspections Involvement 
Public school 9.179** 4.799*** 
 (4.308) (0.510) 
2007 dummy -4.143 2.214* 
 (4.172) (1.306) 
2007 x Public -4.724 -5.513*** 
 (3.648) (1.120) 
Rural School 5.000 6.500*** 
 (3.978) (0.398) 
2007 x Rural 2.932 -1.898 
 (4.606) (1.347) 
Rural x Public -0.241 -0.705 
 (4.367) (0.569) 
2007 x Rural x Public -4.441 1.010 
 (4.283) (1.256) 
Constant 7.000* 10.50*** 
 (3.978) (0.398) 
District x Rural dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 298 298 
R-squared 0.406 0.582 
  
Appendix A.  
Table A1: Variable labels 
Variable Label 
Repeat dummy 1 if pupil has ever repeated, 0 otherwise 
Scholastics Measure of basic scholastic materials the pupil has. 
Homework help 1 if pupil gets help at home, 0 otherwise. 
Regular meals 1 if Pupil gets at least two meals daily, 0 otherwise. 
Weekly load Grade six teacher average number of teaching hours. 
New teacher 1 if less than 6 years of teaching experience 
Testing frequency (Test) 1 if teacher gives written weekly in-class tests, 0 otherwise  
Community importance 1 if school head ranks community contacts in top two activities, 0 otherwise.  
Complete classes Proportion of classes held in complete classroom structures. 
Incomplete classes Proportion of classes held in partially complete class rooms (usually roofed). 
Open-air classes Proportion of classes held in the open-air. 
Termly evaluation 1 if teacher performance assessment by head teacher is termly, 0 if monthly.  
Absent Never 1 if school never experiences teacher absenteeism problem, 0 otherwise. 
Absent sometimes 1 if school sometimes experiences teacher absenteeism problem, 0 otherwise. 





Appendix B. Summarized impacts for the FPE intervention in Kenya 
Table B1: Impacts on Pupils’ test scores 
 Details Hypothesis test Reading Math 
(a) Public Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃+β𝐹𝑅+β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -0.319*** -0.266*** 
(b) Public Urban β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃 -0.290*** -0.222** 
(c) (a) Vs. (b) β𝐹𝑅 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -0.029 -0.044 
(d) Private Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑅  -0.290 -0.130 
(e) Private Urban β𝐹  0.202 0.384* 
(f) (d) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑅 -0.492 -0.514 
(g) (a) Vs. (d) β𝐹𝑃 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -0.029 -0.135 
(h) (b) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑃 -0.492** -0.606*** 
*** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance 
 
 
Table B2: Impacts on Pupils’ test scores by gender 
   Girls Boys 
 Details Hypothesis test Reading Math Reading Math 
(a) Public Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃+β𝐹𝑅+β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -0.355*** -0.271*** -0.285*** -0.254*** 
(b) Public Urban β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃 -0.353*** -0.224** -0.229** -0.217 
(c) (a) Vs. (b) β𝐹𝑅 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -0.002 -0.047 -0.056 -0.037 
(d) Private Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑅  0.031 0.128 -0.691** -0.393 
(e) Private Urban β𝐹  -0.049 0.17 0.359* 0.522** 
(f) (d) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑅 0.08 -0.042 -1.050*** -0.915** 
(g) (a) Vs. (d) β𝐹𝑃 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -0.386 -0.399 0.406 0.139 
(h) (b) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑃 -0.304 -0.394 -0.588*** -0.739*** 
*** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance 
 
Table B3: Impacts on Grade six teacher Efforts 
   Reading teacher Math teacher 
 Details Hypothesis test Effort Effort 
(a) Public Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃+β𝐹𝑅+β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -8.852** -8.252*** 
(b) Public Urban β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃 -4.433 -7.393*** 
(c) (a) Vs. (b) β𝐹𝑅 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -4.419 -0.859 
(d) Private Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑅  -1.264 2.593 
(e) Private Urban β𝐹  7.987* 7.217* 
(f) (d) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑅 -9.251 -4.624 
(g) (a) Vs. (d) β𝐹𝑃 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -7.588 -10.845 
(h) (b) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑃 -12.42** -14.61*** 








Table B4: Impacts on other school level variables – Inspections and Local involvement 
 Details Hypothesis test Inspections Involvement 
(a) Public Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃+β𝐹𝑅+β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -10.376*** -4.187*** 
(b) Public Urban β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑃  -8.867*** -3.299*** 
(c) (a) Vs. (b) β𝐹𝑅 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃 -1.509 -0.888 
(d) Private Rural β𝐹 + β𝐹𝑅 -1.211 0.316 
(e) Private Urban β𝐹  -4.143 2.214* 
(f) (d) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑅 2.932 -1.898 
(g) (a) Vs. (d) β𝐹𝑃 + β𝐹𝑅𝑃  -9.165*** -4.503*** 
(h) (b) Vs. (e) β𝐹𝑃 -4.724 -5.513*** 
*** 1% level of significance; ** 5% level of significance; * 10% level of significance 
 
